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A COMPARISON OF SOME METHODS OF CONCILIATION
AND ARBITRATION OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES.
N these times when we see combinations of employers co-operat-
ing under trade agreements with combinations of employees
to conduct immense industries, we are apt to forget the re-
markable development of ideas concerning industrial economy that
has occurred within a life-time. It was only eighty years ago that
the merchants of Boston met to discountenance and check what
were then" regarded as unlawful combinations of workmen formed
to protest against the long work day, low wages, and oppressive
rules of their masters. The sum of $20,0oo was raised at this meet-
ing of merchants and ship owners to fight the movement for a ten
hour day. Such men as Wendell PHILLIPs, Horace MANN, and
Robert RANTOuI, espoused the journeymen's cause. The right of
workmen to combine for exactly these purposes, then considered by
many as unlawful, has long since been recognized.
Now we see in the industrial field managers of millions of money
meeting periodically the representatives of thousands of workmen
in their respective industries, and forming, after conference and
debate, agreements for the continuance of the industry. A com-
paratively new term-"Collective Bargaining"--aptly defines what
then takes place.
Under the present conditions, collective bargaining seems indis-
pensable to the peacefulness of industrial life. The vastness of our
modern business enterprises and the complexity of the questions
involved in conducting them make necessary the dealing of organi-
zation with organization. If negotiations are honestly and fairly
conducted, and if agreements made are adhered to, industrial peace
results. Employers who still decline to accept this method of main-
taining industrial peace may well contemplate the words of Hon.
Seth Low-in his annual address of 1912 as President of The Civic
Federation. He said:
"It appears to me utterly impossible for stockholders
united in a corporation to sustain themselves in the position
of claiming for themselves every privilege of combination,
and at the same time, to insist upon dealing with their em-
ployees only as individuals and to deny to them the right of
collective bargaining. When a corporation declines to recog-
nize a labor union, is it not doing precisely this? I under-
stand perfectly that the employer would rather be entirely
free to do as he pleases. The precise point I am trying to
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make clear is, that he cannot expect to be free to do as he
pleases under the conditions of modern industry. * * * The
employer can decline, as he often does, to recognize a union,
and in that way he can provoke strikes, which in their turn
result in violence. When he does this simply because he is
unwilling to recognize a labor union, he perpetuates, if he
does not create, a state of war in industry; and he must share
the responsibility for this result when he acts so illogically."
Because of the great and ever increasing size of our industrial
organizations, and because, further, many of these organizations
are engaged in business affected with a public use, the public is
quite directly interested in interruptions by strike or lockout of the
regular order of business, and cannot properly stand aside, as it
once did, and let the parties "fight it out."
It is unfortunately true that the public often fails to recognize
its interest in such disputes until the combatants draw on it for the
funds with which to carry on the war; and it is further unfortun-
ately true that even then it often lacks the patience necessary to get
at the fundamental causes of the trouble,-nevertheless it is also
true that society is coming more and more to realize that industrial
war in the form of strikes and lockouts is an evil which should be
lessened and, if possible, prevented. When industrial disputes have
at length reached such a stage that they disturb the general public,
as well as the immediate parties to them, we hear a great deal about
rights, but very little about duties. The rights of employers, the
rights of the employees, the rights of those who would be employeesr
or employers, but are not allowed to be such, the rights of society
which is composed of all these and others-these rights are insisted
upon, while members of the different social groups, regarding the
contest from their own point of view, overlook their mutual depend-
ence and their reciprocal obligations.
Employers and employed seem to forget that the general public
alone makes employment worth while, and the general public,
having neglected its duty to provide some other means than strike
or lockout for settling most industrial disputes, blames the disput-
ants and realizes only when the war is on that it should have done
something to prevent it. In ignorance of the facts, the public passes
judgment upon its fellow men and condemns the one party or the
other according to the prejudices of the hour.
Each dispute and each strike must be judged by its own facts;
but, under usual conditions, how can the public know the facts?
Economi history shows that some strikes have been the means
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of bringing about great good; though evils, they have often dis-
placed greater evils. Economists of repute generally concur in the
opinion that while strikes may have been unwisely inaugurated in
many cases, nevertheless the right to strike is, under our present
industrial system, a necessary safeguard of workingmen's interests.
Fair-minded employers have admitted this. Statistics prepared by
government officials indicate that strikes have often proved benefi-
cial in the long run.
Nevertheless, this hostile method of composing labor controversies
ought to be used only as a last resort. But if it is to be used only as
a last resort, some other earlier resort must be provided. Society
Js under an obligation to each and all of its constituents to provide
some other way than this trial by battle for the settlement of in-
dustrial disputes. Society's annoyance does not furnish the only
reason for the provision of something approaching the judicial
method in these cases; another and a better reason is that it is its
duty to see that justice is done after an investigation of the facts
and after a study of the economic and social principles involved in
such disputes.
Of course it is as vain to hope for the total disappearance of
strikes or lockouts as it is to hope for the total disappearance of
less public frays. People still quarrel with violence over matters
which might be determined in the courts, but the fighting method
of settling private disputes is generally effectively prevented by
society, which furnishes courts for their adjustment, while the
hostile method of settling these larger disputes is permitted because,
vhen the parties have got beyond the conferring stage, or have never
reached it, no other way is provided for their settlement.
We should not expect an exact likeness between our law courts
and commissions or boards established for the settlement of indus-
trial disputes. Our courts are the result of long evolution; legal
rules are fairly well established on fixed lines; the questions to be
decided generally relate to past transactions, rather than to future
acts and relations. In the settlement of industrial disputes, on the
other hand, there is a continuing future relation involved, and the
important matters are those that are going to happen. These mat-
ters are not as capable of decision or final judgment as are the
issues in an ordinary law-suit. A contract between the parties
themselves is desirable in industrial disputes, rather than some other
person's decision. Hence mediation and conciliation leading to a
just agreement seem better than anything like a formal trial. But
there often comes a time when the interests of all demand that there
should be something approximating the judicial investigation and
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determination of these controversies. Various methods have been
suggested to bring about these ends.
As this is a practical question, it seems worth while to examine
what actually has been done, and what experience teaches on the
subject.
Twenty-nine of our states have laws providing for some sort of
arbitration for, settling labor disputes. Aside from one or two
points of general resemblance, great diversity exists among them.
Judging, however, from some reports of their working, one may
say that some laws which seem inadequate have produced fair
results, apparently because of the men who operated them. Little
can be said of others, -because they have seldom been tried.
1 There
are three statutes which have been tested and which may be taken
as typicAl of three different orders of laws on this subject. These
are (I) the law of the United States; which may be called the
ERD1%fAN-NtWLANDS ACT; (2) the CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL Dis-
PUTES INVESTIGATION ACT; and (3) the so-called COMPULSORY
ARBITRATION LAW of New Zealand.
One of the results of the great railway strike of 1894 and the
discussions following it was the passage of the so-called ERDMAN
ACT of 1898. An earlier law of Congress was at the same time
repealed.
The ERDMAN ACT applied to railroad companies and their em-
ployees engaged in train operation.
The act makes provision for mediation and conciliation, as well
as for arbitration; and while arbitration was intended to be its
most important function, in its practical operation mediation and
conciliation have proved more advantageous and have been resorted
to more frequently than arbitration.
This act remained in force fifteen years-that is, until it was
replaced in July, 1913, by the NEWLANDS ACT. For more than one-
half its life, however, it was hardly used. Nevertheless, from the
latter part of I9o6 until July, I9M3, it was made effective in more
than sixty disputes, some of which threatened disastrous conse-
quences. Under this law, when it had become apparent that the
dispute could not be settled by the immediate parties themselves,
application for mediation might be made by either side, requesting
the mediators (who were originally the Chairman of the Interstate
'The law of Wisconsin (igix) providing for an Industrial Commission is more than
an arbitration law. Its general purpose is to center in one body many of the relations of
employer and employee. The proper administration of such a law should render indus-
trial disputes less frequent than they have been. See "Labor and Administration," by
Professor John R. Commons, Macmillan, 19r3.
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Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor) to use
their best efforts to induce an amicable settlement, and, these efforts
failing, to try to -bring about arbitration under the terms of the act.
It is important to note, as tending to show the value of even this
imperfect law, that in forty-eight cases, for which definite statis-
tics are accessible, applications have been made by both parties in
sixteen instances, by employees in thirteen instances, and by rail-
road companies in nineteen. This ought to encourage the hope that
somewhat similar means may be resorted to in other industries for
the same purpose.
Moreover, when practice under this law disclosed defects, both
the men and the companies showed their good will towards the
purpose of the law by suggesting improvements; and many of these
suggestions took legal form in the NEWI,ANDS ACT of July, 1913,
which is the ERDMAN ACT remodeled and somewhat enlarged.
For example, the duties of mediator had devolved, under the
former act, on the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the Commissioner of Labor, both having other duties to
perform, but these duties had been seen to be so important, that by
the NrMLANDS ACT two new offices are created, namely: that of
Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation, and that of Assistant
Commissioner, and on these Commissioners will devolve the chief
work connected with intervention, though two other officials, to-
gether with the Commissioner, compose the "Board of Mediation
and Conciliation."
Another change made by the NxWLANDS ACT is in the provision
that the mediators may, without application, and upon their own
initiative, proffer* their services when an interruption of traffic is
imminent and fraught with serious detriment to the public interest;
there was regularly no intervention by the mediators under the
ERDMAN ACT unless one or both parties applied for it.
An important provision of the later act is that concerning the
number of arbitrators, when arbitration becomes necessary.
The old act provided for three arbitrators: one chosen by each
of the respective parties, and the third by these two; or; if they
failed to agree, then by the mediators. This is the prevailing method
of forming such boards. But it is clear that the burden placed upon
the third arbitrator selected by this process is often too great for
one man; moreover, as he must endeavor to bring the others to-
gether-for they represent opposing interests-there is apt to result
a decision brought about by the splitting of differences; this often
is no real settlement, but a temporary adjustment in the nature of
a compromise.
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The proper composition of a board of arbitration has been the
subject of much discussion; and there is room for difference of
opinion concerning it. Shall the board consist of three members,
or more than three? Shall there be some representatives of each
party on it, or shall all its members be disinterested? Shall there be
a permanent board or one for the special occasion? These and
similar questions are practically of much importance. Experience
has partially answered some of them.
But the success of boards of conciliation and boards of arbitration,
under any law, has often been due rather to the personnel of the
boards than to the manner of their selection.
It is worth noting that some of the most efficient members of
such bqdies have been men engaged in work generally deemed im-
practical, as, for example, college professors, clergymen, editors
and lawyers.
A greater number than three arbitrators seems desirable: the
NEWLANDS ACT provides for either three or six, a majority of
whom may make an award.
There are reasons for believing that a board composed partly
of members continuously employed in the work of conciliation and
arbitration, and partly of members selected for the special occasion,
would produce more satisfactory results than one wholly made up
of permanent members on the one hand, or of those chosen for the
special occasion on the other.
The ERDMAN Acr was not a compulsory arbitration law, nor is
its successor. Neither employer nor employee is compelled to ask
for mediation or arbitration, nor are they required to refrain from
a lockout or a strike.
If arbitration is resorted to, it is because the parties so agree'in
writing; and in this writing they agree to many other things, among
them that each will faithfully execute the award. The award is
filed in the United States District Court and goes into effect as a
judgment. The difficulty of enforcing a judgment of this kind is
obvious.
Senator NXwrV ANDS was asked in the Senate, just before the
adoption of the present Iaw, by what means the award would be
carried into effect if the parties chose to ignore it, and he replied:
"I am not prepared to state what effect would be given
to the award of the arbitrators if the parties chose to ignore
it. * * * I would prefer not to enter upon that discussion.
It-abounds in difficulties, and it will be largely a matter of
prediction in which I prefer not to indulge."
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Dr. NtILL, former Commissioner of Labor, says, speaking of the
ERD-TAN ACT, that "in no case has there been a repudiation by either
side of the award of an arbitration board."
2
The force relied on in these cases to carry out the award is the
force of public opinion, and the moral obligation that arises from
the fact that the parties have agreed to be bound by the decision.
Public opinion has been effective in some cases where railway
managers and workers have had disputes, as well as in other cases.
In November, 1912, the special board of seven arbitrators made an.
award in the long standing dispute between some thirty thousand
employees and fifty-two railroad companies and, though it was
satisfactory to the representatives of neither party, a strike of far
greater dimensions than the anthracite coal strike of 19o2 was pre-
vented mainly by the force of public opinion. This award, by the
way, having been made in November, it became necessary for
Chairman VA.N HisF to reconvene the board during February fol-
lowing to decide what the award really meant. Notwithstanding
this experience, the Eastern railroads and their firemen, in February,
1913, prevented a great strike by arbitrating under the ERDAVAN
ACT: the managers of -the railroads acceded to arbitration under
what they regarded as a defective and inadequate law in deference
to public opinion and to avoid a strike, but they suggested to the
public this question for consideration: whether "in thus securing
temporary convenience and accommodation, they are not sacrificing
their permanent welfare?" 3 This is a question the public might
well consider whenever there is talk of settling industrial disputes
in any but a just way, or of settling them upon principles of mere
expediency and temporarily, rather than upon principles of enduring
equity.
Even under the somewhat inadequate law of Massachusetts,
public opinion worked at least some relief during the Boston street
railway strike of 1912 when Mayor FITZGERALD requested the state
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration to follow the law which
authorized the board to investigate the dispute "and ascertain which
party thereto is mainly responsible or blameworthy for the existence
or continuance of the same" and to "publish a report finding such
cause and assigning such responsibility or blame." It was found in
this case that there was practically but one question, namely: whether
the men might organize themselves by their own methods into unions
without thereby endangering their employment. After the board
2 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 98,. p. 3.
2 The Survey, vol. 29, p. 743.
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took hold of the matter the strike was settled and the demands of
the men were conceded.
Whether or not public opinion can be relied upon to compel the
parties in industrial disputes to abide by an award, or to terminate
the dispute in the absence of an award, it is at least certain that it
can work effectively- for anything like a just conclusion only when
it is an informed and intelligent public opinion.
Under the Canadian law the first object is conciliation, though
when arbitration is brought about-as it may be when conciliation
fails-public opinion is there, also, the sole compelling force.
There is reason to believe that this law makes possible a more
accurately informed public opinion than do most of our laws, for
the simple reason that investigation precedes, rather than follows,
strikes and lockouts. To judge it by its fruits, as shown by statis-
tics and reports, its short life since March, 1907, has been useful.
It is designed to apply primarily to public utilities, including mines;
industries in which the public has the greatest interest in continuous
service.
The official report of the Canadian Department of Labor states
that during the first five years of the Act, 124 applications for boards
of conciliation and investigation were received, and that iio boards
were established, the 14 remaining cases being settled before the
boards were appointed. Out of the i1o cases referred for investi-
gation, 93 resulted in direct agreements after the investigation,
or in such improved relations between the parties as to end
the disputes. During the five years, there have been 14 instances
out of iio in which strikes have occurred after the reference to
the boards, but in most of these 14 cases, there was finally an adop-
tion in substance of the boards' recommendations. Of course, this
does not necessarily mean that in 124 cases there would have been
strikes but for the law, though it must show that many were pre-
vented.
The Canadian law is based upon the sound propositions that the
public has a right to know about the causes of industrial disputes,
especially where public utilities are concerned; that these causes
should be so known before strikes or lockouts occur, rather than
after their occurrence; and, further, that if the parties to a differ-
ence can be brought together and have a frank discussion of the
matters in question between them, especially in the presence of
just men whom -they respect, the probabilities are that an agree-
ment will be reached.Investigation, with a view to amicable settlement of the dispute,
is the duty of the board. In effect, this investigation is compulsory,
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and while it is pending there is no suspension of work. Publicity
follows investigation, and then, as a last resort, the dissatisfied
party may exercise the always reserved right to strike or to lockout.
Neither party is deprived of any right, though the exercise of the
right to inconvenience the public is postponed. If after an investi-
gation, often disclosing facts which in reality neither party knew;
and if after friendly conferences during which passions have cooled;
and if after a board's full report to an interested public-if, then,
one of the parties considers it best to resort to war, in the shape of
strike or lockout, he may do so-but experience has shown that,
as a rule, his battle is lost before it is begun.
Without now going into a detailed examination of the machinery
of this law, it may. be confidently asserted that its general principles
can be adopted in properly drawn statutes in the United States so
as to avoid any infringement of the well recognized rights of both
employers and employees, and indeed so as to afford them both a
means of justly determining disputes by reason rather than by force.
Proper modifications must be made in the law to suit our local
conditions, and perhaps some improvements can be made which
would apply even to Canada; as, for example, provision for a larger
board than one of three members; and, perhaps, that there should
be a permanent chairman rather than one appointed for each
occasion. A reasonable objection urged by labor unions against this
law is that during the period while a strike is prohibited, as the law
stands, the employer may prepare himself for meeting an unfavor-
able result of the investigation by engaging strike-breakers. Thig
matter can be provided for in any properly -drawn law, so that an
-employer will be obliged to live up to the spirit as well as the letter
of the law, which is meant to preserve the status quo until the in-
vestigation shall have been finished.
Where attempts have been made to introduce such a law in the
United States, some unreasonable objections have been made by
both employers and employees. These objections seem to ariso
chiefly from a misunderstanding of the purpose and effect of the
law. It does not make it a crime to strike, nor does it deprive
workers of this powerful, and perhaps sometimes useful, means of
obtaining justice, as some union men have thought; nor does it, on
the other -hand, unnecessarily or unfairly disclose to an employer's
rival the secrets of his business, as some employers have contended;
nor, seemingly, does it tend to make more frequent the demands of
employees on employers.
It is rather important to note that the Canadian law is not really
an arbitration law; both pArties may, under the law, agree to regard
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the board as a board of arbitration; but the chief purpose of the act
is to provide means of investigation, discussion, conciliation and
publicity. The board appointed under the law investigates and
mediates and advises, but ordinarily does not decide. As its recom-
mendation differs, therefore, from a court's judgment and from
an arbitrator's award, the parties and the board are less likely to
insist upon unchangeable rules governing future relations. , Settle-
ments are not even orders; they are rather agreements, made in the
interests of the three parties chiefly concerned: the employer, the
employee and the public.
Rather severe penplties are imposed for the suspension of work
during investigation: a workman may be fined from $io to $5o per
day for striking (befuoe the investigation); an employer may be
fined from $ioo to $i,ooo per day if he locks out; and a third per-
son, inciting either party to break the law, may be fined from $50
to $i,ooo for each offense; but the question of enforcing penalties
seems seldom to have arisen. The Act provides as to this matter
that aggrieved parties may enforce these penalties;.it would seem
wiser to have this done by some public official. But it is hardly
practicable to enforce, in, any way, the penalty against a large num-
ber of men, if they strike; should each striker demand a separate
-trial, several years might be consumed in collecting penalties in one
strike alone. Practically much more has depended upon the mutual
understanding arrived at, and the good will of the parties, than
either penalties or public opinion.
It should be observed that experience under our federal act as
well as under the Canadian Act, teaches that the chances for con-
ciliation and for satisfactory agreements are better when employees
are strongly organized than when they are not. Our former Com-
missioner of Labor says, speaking of the ERDIIAN AcT:
"It is difficult to see how its provisions could be carried
out with any degree of satisfaction except in cases where
organized employees are dealt with. Much of the success
which has marked the operation of this law is probably due
to the fact that the classes of employees with whom it deals
are strongly organized and well-disciplined groups."'
And one who has acted many times as chairman of boards under
the Canadian Act says of that law:
4 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, No. 98, p. s.
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"The law is pretty much a dead letter for any but organ-
ized labor."
and a labor member of the Canadian Parliament says:
"The law amounts to practical recognition of trade or-
ganizations."
Public opinion having failed in some instances to compel obedience
to an award, or to bring about a settlement when no award has been
made, compulsory arbitration is urged by many.
Complete compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes by law
involves the existence of two essential, prominent features: first,
there must be the compulsion of employer and employee to submit
the questions in dispute to arbitration; second, there must be the
compulsion of these parties to conform to the decision of the
arbitrators.
To make any such law even approximately effective, there must
be provided much machinery in detail, but without these two general
features, real compulsory arbitration seems impossible.
When we reflect on what this means, we must, it would seem,
conclude that it is at least doubtful whether there has been, is now,
or ever can be any such thing.
If under some conceivable foy-m of government it could be es-
tablished and maintained, it is almost certain that its effectual
maintenance would be unwise because wasteful.
This view, however, does not make an examination of the sub-
ject necessarily unprofitable, for while perfect compulsory arbitra-
tion may, perhaps, be impossible, nevertheless something nearly like
it may be found to be practicable and desirable, should other means
fail to secure a fair degree of industrial peace. Since 1891, when
the agitation began in Australia for governmental interference of
a drastic nature in industrial disputes, and especially since 1894,
when the so-called CoMPuLsoRy AI"ITRATION LAW was adopted by
Australia's neighbor, New Zealand, there has been a great amount
of discussion on the subject.
There is much conflict of opinion concerning practical results of
the several Australasian experiments. Many find it difficult to under-
stand why it is, if the New Zealand law has accomplished what some
say it has, that Victoria and some other states with similar condi-
tions have adopted different laws; and why it is, if New Zealand
is "a country without strikes," as we have been told it is, that
recently a wide-spread and bitter strike has been in progress there.
The New Zealand law has been repeatedly amended, and rafhet
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recent amendments have served to emphasize its conciliatory and
voluntary features. This is important, for after fourteen years of
trial it was stated by the advocates of the amendments in the debate
on them, that the main principle of the amendments "is to let us
go back to conciliation as far as possible."
The law provides for two kinds of boards or tribunals:
First, Councils of Conciliation, and
Second, A Court of Arbitration.
The Councils are four in number, the colony being divided into
four districts. Each Council hat a chairman appointed for three
years, called a commissioner, and when he cannot effect a settlement,
assessors (one, two or three in number) are nominated to act with
him for the special ocrasion, half of the number being named by
each party: thus forming a board of three, five or seven. The efforts
of these Councils are directed towards bringing about an agreement:
they can make no binding award, but simply recommend terms of
settlement. If an agreement is made it is filed and has the effect
of an award, or if the recommendations of the Council are not
disagreed with by one of the parties within a certain time, they
become operative as an award. If a settlement is not thus effected,
the dispute is referred to the Arbitration Court of the whole colony.
This Court consists of three members7: one is a Judge of the
Supreme Court and the others are appointed upon the nomination
of employers' unions and employees' unions respectively. The court
combines judicial with almost legislative functions, the decision is
made by the judge, and the result is that one official may fix wages
and other cofiditions of employment for the whole country.
The law provides for the registration of Industrial Unions of
employers or employees. Employees, if fifteen or more in number,
wishing to refer a dispute to either the Councils or the Court, must
form a union and register under the act, or trade unions already
organized may so -register; but they must comply with rather strict
and minute regulations as to meetings, officers, manner of making
industrial agreements, audit of accounts, registration of members,
etc., etc. When the Registrar is satisfied on these points, the society
is registered and becomes a body corporate, but, as the law reads.
"solely for the purposes of this act." That is, the union surrenders
much of its freedom as a voluntary organization in return for the
advantage it derives under the law of referring -disputes to the
tribunals established by the law. Registration renders both the
union and its members subject to the jurisdiction of these tribunals.
However, if at any time there is no award or agreement binding a
particular union, it may cancel its registration and become again a
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voluntary organization, unincorporated, and free to strike and
manage its affairs without being subject to the jurisdiction of the
Councils or the Court. This explains why strikes are not entirely
prevented by this law. "Unlawful strike" or "unlawful lockout"
mean, under the law, a strike or a lockout by parties bound by an
award or industrial agreement; and a union is not so bound if it has
never registered, or if, having registered, it has cancelled its regis-
tration.
Penalties of a pecuniary nature in as great a sum as £5oo are
provided for ,breaches of the awards; and other penalties for unlaw-
ful strikes, including formerly imprisonment (if fines were not paid),
but imprisonment has been abolished.
The practical operation of the law may be partially illustrated
by reference to some decisions and awards made under it as reported
in the pamphlets issued by the New Zealand Department of Labor.
An offender against an award is prosecuted for the pecuniary penalty
in the Magistrate's Court, and the plaintiff prosecuting is a Govern-
ment Inspector.
Some of the prosecutions reported are as follows: an employer
is prosecuted for violating an award made concerning the, "Rotorua
Tourist Accommodation and Boarding-house Workers" for "em-
ploying a porter on his weekly half-holiday," and is fined five pounds
and a part -f the costs; on the same day the porter employed is also
prosecuted for "working on his weekly half-holiday," and the penalty
fixed at one pound and part of the costs. An employer is prosecuted
for violating an award concerning shop tailoresses by "failing to
pay minimum wage to a journeywoman (three cases)," and is fined,
while on the same day the three employees involved are prosecuted
and fined for "failing to claim minimum 'wage." An Auckland
butcher is prosecuted and fined for the offense of "employing more
than the proportion of youths to men allowed by award."
Awards under the law are often for three years, and establish
conditions of employment for the period named.
The awards generally contain what is called the "preference
clause" of which the following is an example:
"Preference.
4. (a.) It shall be the duty of every employer when eft-
gaging a worker to ascertain whether he is a member of the
workers' union, and if he is not a member of such union the
employer shall notify the secretary of such union accordingly
within seven days from the time of engaging such worker.
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(b.) It shall be the duty of every non-unionist engaged as
aforesaid to join the workers' union within seven days after
receiving from the secretary of the union a request in writ-
ing to do so, and to remain a member thereof.
(c.) The foregoing provisions of this clause shall operate
only if and so long as the rules of the union shall permit any
person of good character to become and remain a member of
the union, without 'ballot or other election, on payment of an
entrance fee not exceeding 5s., and of subsequent contribu-
tions, whether payable weekly or otherwise, not exceeding
6d. per week."
The encouragement to unions given by the New Zealand law is
so direct as to amount almost to compulsory unionism, while the en-
couragement which the ERDMAN-NWLA--DS ACT and the CANADIAN
INDUSTRIAL DIsPTEs INVESTIGATION ACT give to labor organiza-
tions is indirect, yet effective: in fact, all laws for official conciliation
arid arbitration seem practically to bring about "recognition of the
union" in one form or another. This New Zealand law, besides thus
emphasizing the labor union and collective bargaining, establishes
the minimum wage. It thus creates a system of governmental
regulation of wages and conditions of labor applying to about every
industry in the entire country.
It is not likely that we shall see exactly such a law in this country:
the lack of uniformity in state laws of this character, or in their
administration, that would almost certainly exist, would be a grave
objection, were there no others. While this law interferes with
freedom of contract, it should be noticed that it does not attempt to
compel an employer to carry on his business, nor to compel a work-
man to work under what he regards as objectionable conditions: the
law in effect simply directs that after an award of the court has been
made, the business, - if conducted, must be conducted in a certain.
manner, and the workman, if he works, must work under pre-
scribed conditions. This aspect of the law is not entirely bad.
Something like this has been prescribed by Courts in this country
without any statute. For example, during the trouble arising from
the Pullman strike in 1894 some railroad employees refused to haul
Pullman cars, but they were ordered by the Court to perform this
duty while they continued to work for the railroad company.
5
The law does not attempt to accomplish the impossible thing of
actually compelling a large number of men to work against their
6S6utbdrfi California Ry. Co. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed. 796; and see Toledo, Ann Arbor
etc. Ry. Co. v. Pentisylvania Co. et al., S4 Fed. 746, 756.
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wills. The constitutional objection to it on the ground that it
violates the provision of the Thirteenth Amendment against "in-
voluntary servitude," seems therefore hardly tenable.
Irrespective of this constitutional provision, no court would
attempt to coerce men to work, or employers to operate their busi-
ness.6 The only instance in this country where men in civil life may
be forced to work in accordance with the terms of their contract-
actually seized and held and compelled to work-is to be found in
the law relating to sailors. The Supreme Court of the United States
has held that statutes enabling seamen's contracts to be carried out
in this manner do not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, because
their contracts are exceptional, and the necessities of the public
justify the enforcement of a sailor's contract by exceptional means.
7
Obviously, it is more practicable to make sailors work after you
have seized them and taken them aboard ship than it is to make men
work on land. As Dr. JOHNSON said, sea-life is "perpetual imprison-
ment with the chance of drowning." But the interesting matter to
note in this connection is that an exception once having been made,
and madepartly on account of "the necessities of the public," another
exception may be made, quite as constitutionally, should it be neces-
sary for the public welfare in the case of "public utilities" and in-
dustries of like character.
But it may be said that under the principles of the "peonage"
cases as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States and
some of the State Courts, a statute may not, without violating the
"involuntary servitude" clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, at-
tempt to do indirectly what it cannot d6 directly.' That is, it cannot
be made by statute a crime to violate service contracts and then
this crime be made punishable by fine or imprisonment; and it
might "be argued that this is substantially what a law like New
Zealand's law provides.
It has been suggested,, however, that this is not quite a correct
view. For when a union registers under the act, it surrenders for
itself and its members certain rights in return for certain advantages
accruing from arbitration; and it surrenders these rights partly for
the general public good; when, then, it is punished for striking
against an award, it is punished, not for failing to work in accord-
cArthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 3ro; Roquemore et al. v. Mitchell Bros., x67 Ala. 475;
Webb v. England, 29'Beav. 44.
'Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275.
$Patterson v. Bark Eudora, x9o U. E. x6g. 175.
IBailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 244; State v. Amistead, 103 Miss.- , 6o So. 778.
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ance with the award, nor for striking, but rather for breaking a
contract with the public.
This theory of the matter is suggestive of arguments which tend
to refute objections to such a law made also under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
These arguments do not apply to a law intended to regulate every
kind of industry as strongly as they apply to industries affected with
a public interest: that is, to public utilities and to industries having
to do with the production and distribution of necessary commodities.
When we examine the decisions of the United .States Supreme
Court for the last twenty-five years-more especially, too, for the
last fifteen years-we see a multitude of instances where the re-
served police power of the States has been held to have been law-
fully exercised, though it has interfered in all sorts of ways with the
security of person and property and the freedom of contract assured
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Some of the general expressions of the court in deciding these
cases are worth noting.
The bank guarantee laws of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska
were sustained under the State's police power which the court says
"extends to all great public needs;" Justice HoLMEs saying further:
"It [police power] may be put forth in aid of what is
sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or
strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediate-
ly necessary to the public welfare."' 10
In a recent decision sustaining an ordinance regulating the weight
of bread loaves, the court says:
* * * "there is no absolute freedom of contract; limita-
tions are constantly imposed upon the right of contract freely,
because of restrictions upon that right deemed necessary in
the interest of the general welfare."1
In an earlier case, the court says:
"The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject
to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the
governing authority of the country essential to the safety,
health, peace, good order and morals of the community; ' 2
and again it says:
loIn Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, x1; Shallenberger v. First State
Bank, 219 U. S. 114; Assaria Bank v. Dolley, 219 U. S. 121.
u Schnldinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578.
"Crowley v. Christiansen, 137 U. S. 86, 89.
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"The State may interfere wherever the public interests
demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is neces-
sarily vested in the legislature to determine not only what the
interests of the public require, but what measures are neces-
sary for the protection of such interests."
13
What MARSHALL said of the Constitution as it was in his day
is true of such general provisions as have since been added to it.
He said that it
"was intended to endure for ages to come, and to be
adapted to the various crises in human affairs.'
'1 4
It is a mistake to suppose that the Constitution stands in the way of
progress: its very generality makes possible its adaptation to chang-
ing conditions.
Our highest court has sustained on these general principles legis-
lation of the states in the following cases, to select a few from very
many: under various sanitary and food laws our bread and milk,
bread and butter and jam are regulated; we may not buy cigarettes
or liquor; we must work only a certain number of hours and receive
our wages in a certain way, and at a certain time (these latter laws,
by the way, are not sustained simply because they promote the wel-
fare of those supposed to be at an economic disadvantage, but as
well because they promote the general welfare); we must erect
buildings not to exceed a certain height; we must be vaccinated; we
may insist on our school children being carried for half-fare on
street railways; railroad rates may be regulated and also the rates
of grain elevators, telephone, gas, and water supply companies.
Several hundred laws of similar character have been held by the
court to be valid and iot to have denied the complaining parties the
equal protection of the laws, nor to have deprived them of liberty
or property without due process of law.
All this being so, does the Constitution of the United States pre-
vent the exercise in a reasonable, unarbitrary manner of a state's,
police power to establish something closely approaching compulsory
arbitration, applicable to public service corporations and their em-
ployees, and to those engaged in supplying the public with necessary
commodities? It seems it does not.
It is an old principle of law that virtual monopolies may be regu-
lated in the interest of the public, and, under our decisions, to what
extent this regulation shall go is largely discretionary with the
13 Lawton v. Steele, 1z U. S. 133, 136.
2McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 WTheat. 316, 41S.
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legislative authority, and is dependent largely on the exigencies of
the case.
Government exists for the public good; certain kinds of services
are performed, and virtual monopolies are acquired under Govern-
ment also for the public good; their nature makes them public
agencies; when the people find that those conducting these agencies
conduct them as if they were entirely their own affairs, for private
advantage, and also permit the operation of the agency to be inter-
rupted by quarrels among themselves-then, if fundamental prin-
ciples are of value, the people should be able to intervene through
government to protect their intei ests and to see that justice is done.
The principles of compulsory arbitration are not wholly unfamiliar
to us. .People who think "there is nothing to arbitrate" respecting
the title to their land, etc., are compelled every day to come to court.
But a closer analogy to arbitration of labor disputes is to be found
in the public regulation of railroad rates. This compulsory arbitra-
tion between shippers and railroads, between the consumer and the
producer, was objected to by the railways as both impracticable and
unconstitutional, but it is an accomplished fact.
There appears to have been no decision in this country upon the
precise legal questions involved in the matter of "compulsory arbi-
tration." The nearest approach to a decision on the subject seems
to be the answer by the Supreme Court of Colorado in 1886 to ques-
tions as to a certain proposed law: the terms of the law are not set
out, there is no discussion, the whole matter is reported in thirteen
printed lines, and the decision was that a particular section of the
State Constitution relating apparently to private arbitration by
mutual agreement did not contemplate, nor admit of, a law provid-
ing for compulsory submission of differences to arbitration: other
constitutional provisions were not considered.1 If necessary, con-
stitutions may be amended: those of many of our states are easily
amendable.
If constitutional, how far is compulsory arbitration practicable?
Irrespective of pecuniary penalties, which are often uncollectable,
strikes may, it is true, sometimes be broken by arresting the strike
leaders.
Mr. DE s testified before the Pullman Strike Commission ap-
pointed by President CLEVELAND in 1894 that the Courts broke the
strike by removing the leaders from the scene of action.'6
"In the matter of "A Bill for an Act to provide for the amicable adjustment of
grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employees, etc," 9 Colo.
629.
a* See United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 7S94
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Moreover, while it is true that a court will not compel men to
work in a certain place, it might, perhaps, without violating settled
principles, prevent their working elsewhere.
Decisions against employers may be "enforced" by fines, or by
the appointment of a receiver to conduct the business in accordance
with the award.
While, therefore, ways may be suggested by which some of the
objections to compulsory arbitration may be met, nevertheless it
seems certain that there are better ways than this of bringing about
industrial peace.
Our aim should 'be not to try to prevent strikes at all hazards,
but to provide proper conditions of labor, and when differences
arise which cannot be composed by the parties, to supply some
prompt, competent, and just tribunal whose decision will carry
such weight because of its promptness, competency, and justness,
as to enforce itself without penalties. We should aim to establish
permanent peace and good will, and not merely an intermission of
hostilities.
The following -conclusions seem reasonable.
In the first place an educative process is desirable by which all
can be made to see, what experience seems clearly to teach, that
"collective bargaining" is the best preventive of such social dis-
orders, as well as the best cure for them when they have occurred.
Let the labor union speak as employers speak through chosen
representatives; strengthen its self-respect by dealing with it; in-
crease its legal liability, if you will, by enactments enabling it to sue
and be sued; but also avoid constant suspicion, and put it on its
honor; regard it as what it is-one necessary means of social
amendment-and a long step has been taken towards permanent
peace. As suggested above, a properly administered law like that
of Wisconsin (191i) will prevent disputes, but in order that it may
operate effectively and make unnecessary other legislation, it would
seem that organization of both employers and employees should be
fostered.
In the second place, urge the principle of voluntary arbitration
where collective bargaining has brought no results. No legislation
is necessary for this.
Third, provide by legislation some means by which, when the
parties refuse both to bargain and to arbitrate, there may be com-
pulsory official investigation. This may be at the request of one
of the parties, or at the instance of some public official when the
public interest demands it. The best parts of the ERDMAN-NEw-
IANDS AcT and the CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE'S INVESTIGA-
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To-N AcTr furnish models for such a law. This simply affords
'machinery for getting at the truth. As an incident, strikes and
lockouts may be prohibited'during the investigation, but the only
other compulsion in this law should be that which is quite reasonable
in the circumstances, namely compulsory investigation. After that,
moral suasion should be relied on, rather than coercion. If convicts
can be put on their honor and trusted to build roads without guards,
it ought not to be necessary to coerce workingmen or employers.
And then as a last resort, when other more reasonable methods
fail, we may provide for "compulsory arbitration" within the limits
above suggested.
jAmEs H. BREWSTER.
Utsiversiky of Colorado.
